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A POWERLESS COMPANION: 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 
 
SAMUEL MOYN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
It is increasingly common to claim that international human rights law is a 
neoliberal phenomenon. And certainly the common timing is right: the human 
rights revolution and the victory of market fundamentalism have been 
simultaneous. In an important new essay, Marxist international lawyer Susan 
Marks compares Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine with my own recent history 
of international human rights, which emphasizes the 1970s as the moment of 
breakthrough for their ascent. Both histories, Marks observes, ascribe the 
newfound visibility of human rights to their promise to transcend formerly 
attractive political options east and west that seemed inadequate or even 
dangerous.1 “For her too,” Marks acknowledges of Klein’s treatment, “the 
human rights movement as we know it today took shape during the 1970s. And 
for her too, a defining characteristic of the new movement was its non-political 
creed.”2 But for Marks, Klein succeeds by unveiling the neoliberal 
circumstances of human rights that have permanently defined their trajectory: 
[S]he considers that a rather important aspect of the context for the movement’s 
emergence is one Moyn omits to mention: the rise in that period of the neo-liberal 
version of ‘private’ capitalism, with its now familiar policy prescription of 
privatisation, deregulation and state retreat from social provision. To its influential 
enthusiasts then and now, that is the last utopia. . . . From Klein’s perspective, then, 
the history of human rights cannot be told in isolation from developments in the 
history of capitalism.”
3
 
(At this point Marks notes that Milton Friedman won the Nobel prize for 
economics in 1976, the year before Amnesty International was given the Nobel 
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 1.  See Susan Marks, Four Human Rights Myths in HUMAN RIGHTS: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW 
POSSIBILITIES 217 (Kinley et al. eds., 2013). See also NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE 
OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 11 (2007); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
HISTORY (2010); Samuel Moyn, Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of Human 
Rights, 8 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 123 (2012). 
 2.  Marks, supra note 1, at 226. 
 3.  Marks, supra note 1, at 226 and 226 n.44. 
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peace prize.) 
Friedrich Hayek, the guru of neoliberalism, was as impressed a witness of 
the human rights revolution of the 1970s as anyone else. But it is interesting 
that, although occasionally an advocate of the constitutionalization of basic 
liberties like freedom of speech and press, he was in fact an acerbic critic of that 
revolution. In an interview, he described the spike in talk around human rights 
associated with Jimmy Carter’s election to the American presidency as a 
strange fad, which (like all fashions) risked excess: 
I’m not sure whether it’s an invention of the present administration or whether it’s of 
an older date, but I suppose if you told an eighteen year old that human rights is a new 
discovery he wouldn’t believe it. He would have thought the United States for 200 
years has been committed to human rights, which of course would be absurd. The 
United States discovered human rights two years ago or five years ago. Suddenly it’s 
the main object and leads to a degree of interference with the policy of other countries 
which, even if I sympathized with the general aim, I don’t think it’s in the least 
justified. . . . But it’s a dominating belief in the United States now.
4
 
All the same, since that moment of modish popularity, the staying power of 
human rights has led to many more positive visions of the essential harmony—if 
not identity—of economic liberalism and international human rights. The 
Marxist left, indeed, is hardly the only source of claims concerning the 
synergetic relationship between the advancement of market freedoms and 
human rights.5 If anything, it is much more common to promote neoliberalism 
as an agent of the advancement of human rights rather than to link them as 
malign accomplices. 
Perhaps most notably, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues that, although 
human rights law may exact some costs to efficiency, the general relationship 
between economic liberty and human rights is productive and strong, so much 
so that promoting the former and latter are not very different enterprises.6 He 
writes: 
[E]njoyment of human rights require[s] the use of dispersed information and 
economic resources that can be supplied most efficiently, and most democratically, 
through the division of labour among free citizens and through liberal trade promoting 
economic welfare, the freedom of choice and the free flow of scarce goods, services, 
and information across frontiers in response to supply and demand by citizens.
7
 
There is, accordingly, little daylight between economic liberalization and the 
promotion of international human rights. And though Petersmann’s optimism 
 
 4.  Interview by Robert Chitester with Friedrich A. Hayek, at UCLA (1978), available at 
http://www.hayek.ufm.edu/index.php?title=Bob_Chitester_part_I&p=video1&b=930&e=1037. 
 5.  Admittedly, others nearly always construe “human rights” as a set of abstract values rather 
than a set of concrete movements and legal regimes. See, e.g., JOHN C. W. TOUCHIE, HAYEK AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS FOR A MINIMALIST APPROACH TO LAW (2005). 
 6.  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations “Global Compact” for Integrating Human 
Rights in the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. OF INT’L 
L. 621, 621–22 (2002). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: 
Defining and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Thomas 
Cottier et al. eds., 2005). 
 7.  Petersmann, Time for a United Nations, supra note 6, at 629. 
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about near identity has certainly drawn their fire, mainstream international 
human rights lawyers generally envision a large zone of compatibility between 
their norms and standard market arrangements; they merely insist that the 
values of international human rights need to be kept separate so as to provide 
critical purchase on “globalization” if and when it goes wrong.8 In the 
mainstream vision, international human rights can offer a toolbox of legal and 
other standards to guide, tame, and “civilize” an era of transnational market 
liberalization that has generally improved the human condition.9 
This article argues that it is far too soon—analytically in the one case and 
historically in the other—to sign on to either the Marxist or mainstream 
position about the relationship between human rights and neoliberalism. To the 
first position, much more analytical clarity is required to prove more than a 
simple case of conjuncture between the two phenomena that are sometimes too 
easily conflated. To the second, the record so far suggests that human rights 
seem fit to provide little, if any, help in remedying (let alone overturning) the 
development in the history of capitalism that its critics range under the heading 
“neoliberalism.” In largest part that is because, although the record of 
capitalism in our time is highly mixed when it comes to the achievement and 
violation of basic human rights, its most serious victim is equality (of resources 
and opportunities alike) both in national and global settings—a value that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the international human 
rights movements following in its wake do not even set out to defend.10 Since 
globalizing neoliberalism and international human rights emerged at the same 
moment and developed in parallel, there are undoubtedly connections to be 
found. But the interactions between human rights and neoliberalism are more 
subtle than Marxists so far claim. Indeed, the crucial connection is a missed 
connection: precisely because the human rights revolution has at its most 
ambitious dedicated itself to establishing a normative and actual floor for 
protection, it has failed to respond to—or even allowed for recognizing—
neoliberalism’s obliteration of the ceiling on inequality. 
“Neoliberalism,” especially in leftist discourse, often does massive work in 
diverse settings of argument, coming close through its overuse to functioning as 
a call for explanation rather than the real thing. And with its moral charge, it is 
sometimes deployed like holy water, sprinkled liberally for safety’s sake to ward 
off evil. Although its rise as an item of discourse and apotropaic talisman 
 
 8.  Philip Alston has famously alleged that Petersmann’s goal was “to hijack, or more 
appropriately to Hayek, international human rights.” See Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and 
Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 815, 816 
(2002). 
 9.  See, e.g., RHODA E. HOWARD-HASSMANN, CAN GLOBALIZATION PROMOTE HUMAN 
RIGHTS? (2010); DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 1–3 (2009). 
 10.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
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reflects understandable anger, it is also symptomatic of explanatory confusion.11 
Nonetheless, as David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy indicate in their 
introduction to this issue, citing an inadequate shorthand for the complex of 
individualist thought, market solutions, and state retrenchment both 
domestically and internationally is better than omitting these topics altogether, 
as American legal scholarship has so far done to its detriment.12 
But looking beyond America, the prominence of neoliberalism as a category 
in scholarship about human rights means that the exact nature of the linkage of 
the two requires as much attention as the omission of the former from thinking 
about the latter. “Human rights, as with power and money, became a means to 
an end of globalizing neoliberal democracy,” Stephen Hopgood remarks in his 
much noticed recent study, in a commonplace observation.13 And yet, so far, 
Marxists such as Wendy Brown, Susan Marks, and others have offered 
indeterminate and unsubstantiated claims that do not suffice to plausibly 
elevate the chronological coincidence of human rights and neoliberalism into a 
factually plausible syndrome. For there is a long way from historical 
“coincidence” or companionship—which there certainly has been between 
neoliberalism and the human rights phenomenon—to actual causality and 
complicity. “We would do well to take the measure of whether and how the 
centrality of human rights discourse might render . . . other political possibilities 
more faint,” Brown has argued in a classic indictment at the center of the recent 
commentary.14 Even this displacement theory, about which Brown explicitly 
invites further reflection rather than offering a strong conclusion, is weak 
compared to the much stronger accusation of complicity that Brown and others 
simultaneously offer.15 
Though it seems likely that some displacement of other schemes of justice 
has indeed occurred thanks to the rise of human rights, I do not think a much 
stronger claim is likely to work.16 To say that human rights were coincident with 
or part of the context of neoliberal victory is not only not to say more—it is also 
not to say much. In particular, it is not to say that neoliberalism has required 
human rights to make its way in the world—or vice versa. Picayune an agenda 
as it might seem to specify how weakly related the ascent of human rights 
 
 11.  See, e.g., Keally McBride, Neoliberalism: Its Untimely Life and Timely Death, paper presented 
at American Political Science Association annual conference, September 2013. 
 12.  David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 1. 
 13.  STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 95 (2013). 
 14.  Wendy Brown, “The Most We Can Hope For. . .”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism, 
103 S. ATLANTIC Q. 451, 461–62 (2004). 
 15.  See id. In the same essay, though tentative about displacement, Brown claims that human 
rights “legitimate” neoliberalism in the form of global free trade and engage in “an old ruse of liberal 
reformers, in pursuing agendas that have significant effects in excess of the explicit reform, while 
insist[ing] that all they are doing is a bit of good or holding back the dark.” Id. at 461. 
 16.  The relationship between human rights and imperial agendas is a separate matter I do not take 
up here, but my own view is that the case for intermittent causal relation is much stronger, for there is 
no denying the role of moral claims in creating legitimacy for great powers (as well as other actors). 
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appears to the market fundamentalism of our time, I suggest that the finding of 
only a tenuous relationship between the two has substantial ramifications for 
judging human rights and their spectacular rise in the last few decades—and 
thus for assessing the mainstream position. 
Excusing human rights from causally abetting the free market victory of the 
neoliberal age is, after all, no defense of their prominence today. It is certainly 
worth considering the possibility that human rights provide some sort of moral 
leverage against neoliberal developments. However, even if the value of the 
normative guidance that human rights provide is undoubted, the trouble is that 
it amounts to little more than a set of mostly rhetorical admonitions. Worse, by 
focusing on a minimum floor of human protection, human rights norms prove 
inadequate in facing the reality that neoliberalism has damaged equality locally 
and globally much more than it has basic human rights outcomes (which, in 
some cases, it may indeed have advanced). It is hardly less distressing, but, so 
far, much more justifiable to conclude that human rights have not made enough 
of a difference in the short timeframe and global space they share with their 
neoliberal frère ennemi. They have been condemned to watch but have been 
powerless to deter. Added to the fact that human rights at least as canonically 
established have nothing to say about the principal value of equality that 
neoliberalism threatens, it seems hard to conclude that they are a useful 
resource in response. 
If my perspective in between Marxism and the mainstream is adequate, it 
also follows that there is not much critical or political value in opposing human 
rights out of understandable outrage at neoliberalism. Instead, the economic 
transformations of the current era force a heavy burden on those concerned to 
formulate or to find a more serious analytical account of economic 
transformations and to offer more robust political resistance than they have 
marshaled so far. And since human rights idioms, approaches, and movements 
are unlikely to offer either—and, indeed, do not strive to do so when it comes to 
inequality—they should stick to their minimalist tasks outside the 
socioeconomic domain, in part to avoid drawing fire for abetting the stronger 
companion of their historical epoch. 
This article is structured to reach these conclusions by examining a range of 
Marxist positions on the relationship between neoliberalism and human rights, 
beginning with Karl Marx’s own theory of rights, both because of its intrinsic 
importance of and its frequent application to current debates. After concluding 
that this theory offers only initial starting points for analyzing international 
human rights and the neoliberal era of capitalism alike, the article’s next part 
turns to the late-twentieth-century history of the companionship of the two, 
tracking their contemporaneous inceptions to examine their harmony and 
dissonance. The final part of the article stresses that human rights offer a 
minimum of protection where the real significance of neoliberalism has been to 
obliterate the previous limitation of inequality. Although human rights idioms, 
regimes, and movements have valuably formulated one approach to that floor, 
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they have so far done little or nothing to build it, even as they have surged 
discursively across the same era as the ceiling on hierarchy has been simply 
blown away. 
II 
THE GARDEN OF EDEN OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 
It is worthwhile to begin by to establishing how much work would be 
required—certainly far beyond that done so far—to regard human rights as an 
apology for “neoliberal” capitalism, in part because of how much work Karl 
Marx’s own texts leave to be done. And this is so for two overlapping sets of 
reasons. For one thing, there were the different phases in Marx’s own account 
of rights, which provide an inadvertent reminder of how institutionally new 
international human rights today are. Second, there is massive distance between 
the globalizing capitalism to which he bore witness and our world. Even if his 
own work provides considerable resources for thinking about rights generally, it 
falls silent when it comes to the specificities of our problem, both because of the 
“neoliberal” form of our capitalism as well as the globalizing reformism of our 
rights movements. 
Marx, of course, offers his most famous criticism of “human rights” in On 
the Jewish Question, where he takes the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen as an index of the failure of political emancipation compared 
to the “human emancipation” for which he calls.17 Yet in this early text, Marx 
usefully makes central (even if he fails to effectively theorize) what may have 
been the central fact of the rights of man for most of their history: they have 
long been constituted within the state.18 There is, of course, no doubt that the 
political language of natural rights had an elective affinity, or an even deeper 
relationship, with the birth and expansion of capitalist social relations, and 
Marx eventually understood that the reduction of rights to his original statist 
framework was misleading.19 Yet it remains of great interest that, in taking the 
French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 as 
his early prooftext, Marx believed that a moral philosophy of natural rights in 
its most abstract formulations depends in history on the agency of the state 
(even nation-state) to be politically operationalized.20 Marx did not take this 
 
 17.  See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker 
ed., 2d ed. 1978). 
 18.  See id. at 23–24. 
 19.  The classic argument is C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE 
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962). 
 20.  Historians such as Richard Tuck have diagnosed a much deeper causal relationship than Marx 
himself perceived between the ascendancy of rights in early modern natural law theory and the 
perfection of modern state as the essential and long-term forum of their political meaning. See 
RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT (2001). I followed Tuck’s general argument 
somewhat slavishly in my own book in distinguishing international human rights. See Moyn, supra note 
1, at ch.1. 
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alliance to be a contingent mistake; to him, it was rather a core feature of the 
rise of rights. Textually, to put it differently, Marx’s critique of human rights is a 
critique of political emancipation within the state. If his critique is directed at the 
formal abstraction of rights, then it is abstraction within a (rather institutionally 
concrete and historically specific) forum of the political citizenship provided by 
the state.21 
Marx’s insistence on the limits of the state as an agent of emancipation, 
alongside his lack of interest in the state-making many have prized down 
through the era of twentieth-century decolonization, should thus not distract 
from the fact that his own framing of the significance of the rights of man in his 
most classical treatment fails to link them to the workings of global capital. 
Whether or not Marx’s critique transposes easily to the abstractions of rights in 
moral philosophy, then, it definitely requires significant theoretical work—and 
ultimately, a changed account from that early essay—to apply it to modern-day 
international and global human rights politics. When they became a newly 
prestigious mobilizational and legal option, international human rights politics 
broke in fundamental ways with the statist framework within which Marx 
himself worked and the institutionalized rights politics that he observed in the 
French Revolution. If anything, the centrality of the state to bourgeois order 
indeed meant that the response of working men had to be itself globalizing, 
though certainly not in the mode of contemporary human rights activists. 
None of this means that the entanglements of “human rights” and “modern 
capitalism” (including “neoliberalism”) do not exist, but it does mean that they 
are not obvious, even or especially for Marxists, who must build rather than 
assume an account of them. And as much as Marx’s own theoretical evolution 
after On the Jewish Question provides better grounds for success in this venture, 
it also leaves severe obstacles. For one thing, it is also true, as recent research 
has shown, that Marx himself was by no means above invoking rights as a basis 
of progressive reform, in spite of his apparently totalistic rejection of them 
before.22 Indeed, as Andrew Sartori emphasizes, the constitutive emancipatory 
promise of liberalism and its rights talk as Marx understood both as much 
authorized intermittent criticisms of capitalism (and empire) as obfuscated their 
obvious depredations.23 But the real challenge is that Marx’s ultimate critique of 
rights is general, going to the relation between the globalization of capital, 
property ownership, and social abstraction, rather than anything so narrow and 
 
 21.  That was why the response to a bourgeois regime of rights required the liquidation of the 
distinction between the state and civil society, and though perhaps not what Engels later called the 
“withering away” of the state. 
 22.  See DAVID LEOPOLD, THE YOUNG KARL MARX: GERMAN PHILOSOPHY, MODERN 
POLITICS, AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 150–63 (2009); Justine Lacroix & Jean-Yves Pranchère, Karl 
Marx fut-il vraiment un opposant aux droits de l’homme?: Émancipation individuelle et théorie des 
droits, 62 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 433 (2012) (both demonstrating Marx’s 
deployment of rights talk for the sake of emancipation). 
 23.  ANDREW SARTORI, LIBERALISM IN EMPIRE: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY (2014). I am very 
grateful to Professor Sartori for assistance with this part of the article. 
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particular as an analysis of international human rights regimes and movements 
(which, if they existed in his time, did not interest him). 
When he evolved beyond the juvenilia of On the Jewish Question, Marx 
altered his presentation of bourgeois rights to moderate the statist emphasis of 
his early account. But these theoretical shifts were really in the service of an 
account emphasizing how a (potentially) globalizing set of market relations 
required a set of social abstractions that might comfortably take formal 
individual rights as its legal form. Hence Marx’s claim in Capital that the 
capitalist market is 
a very Eden of the innate rights of man. . . . [There individuals] contract as free 
persons, who are equal before the law. Their contract is the final result in which their 
joint will finds a common legal expression. . . . [E]ither in accordance with the pre-
established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an omniscient providence, 
they all work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal, and in the 
common interest.
24
 
Yet even in the evolved form of Marx’s critique, there is a drastic set of 
differences between that general account—which might fit, for example, the 
modern globalization of markets and the globalization of property rights quite 
well—and some specific account needed to capture the particularity of 
international human rights regimes and movements in the last several decades.25 
After all, neoliberal capitalism is a specific episode in the history of 
capitalism that Marx never knew. More important for my purposes here, today, 
human rights are often self-consciously presented (though not with great 
plausibility, as I ultimately argue) as a force that can or will moderate or even 
reverse the evils of the current form of global market relations. Stereotypically, 
and to some extent really, human rights legal orders and mobilizational politics 
have lost their associations to the defense of freedom of contract and private 
property—there are other bodies of law, and other movements, for that 
purpose. Rather, in human rights regimes from the United Nations processes to 
treaty mechanisms, and in human rights movements from Amnesty 
International to global antipoverty campaigns, the goal is to ameliorate the 
suffering of others or even insist upon the basis for justified, though minimal, 
redistribution. Whatever one wants to say about human rights as they exist 
today, in short, must depart radically from Marx’s early work, and build 
 
 24. 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 280 (Ben Fowkes trans., 
1976). 
 25.  As Marx’s own treatments imply, appeal to natural and human rights remained more common 
in his own era as cited rationales for the protection of free contract and private property. In fact 
neoliberals today refer much more rarely to the justificatory basis of natural or human rights than their 
nineteenth-century forebears did in defense of their economic liberalism, presumably because 
reformists and humanitarians have so successfully captured the language for their cause. Compare 
ROBERT GREEN MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 1865–1910, 
ch.5 (1951) (entitled “Judicial Conservatism and the Rights of Man”), with Samuel Moyn, Nationalism 
and Capitalism as Nineteenth-Century Rights Movements, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
HISTORY (Devin O. Pendas ed., forthcoming) (both demonstrating the popularity of libertarian rights 
talk in the nineteenth century). 
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substantially on his later work. And though Marx could not have theorized 
either neoliberalism or human rights as they are now known, he might not have 
been surprised to learn that the chief objection to the latter is that they share 
the same historical era as the former without unsettling it. 
III 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NEOLIBERAL ECONOMICS: HARMONY AND 
DISSONANCE 
Although the broad outlines of the emergence of neoliberalism have been 
and continue to be the subject of an accelerating and exciting literature, in the 
final analysis the origins are fairly straightforward. As the prospect of state-led 
growth and redistribution loomed in the middle of the twentieth century, 
Friedrich Hayek and his initially obscure compatriots, offering a complex 
revival of nineteenth-century economic liberalism, linked the emergence of the 
Western welfare state to the communist planned economy (even though, in fact, 
the leaders of welfare states were about to enter a bitter global struggle with 
their communist opposite numbers). Thirty years later, in the midst of the 
1970s, the neoliberals suddenly and surprisingly found in the economic crisis of 
the welfarist project an opening for their views.26 The rest of neoliberalism’s 
history since that breakthrough moment is well-known: the evisceration of the 
regulatory state in the North Atlantic industrial zone together with an 
international program towards the global south (as well as, perhaps most 
spectacularly, formerly communist Eastern Europe) to facilitate capital 
movement to the detriment of opposing forces.27 Strikingly, this barebones 
narrative has numerous parallelisms to the history of the emergence of human 
rights. After all, human rights also revive a version of classical liberalism in new 
form. Intellectually, international human rights were not new in the 1970s but 
enjoyed new practical circumstances in the middle of that decade that made 
them prestigious overnight. And during the 1970s (as well as today), the 
premier target of international human rights politics was (and continues to be) 
the postcolonial and developmentalist state. These coincidences seem to be (in 
the Marxist phrase) “no accident.” 
 
 26.  See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE 
DEPRESSION (2012). 
 27.  On intellectual foundations, aside from BURGIN, supra note 26, see SERGE AUDIER, NÉO-
LIBÉRALISMES: UNE ARCHÉOLOGIE INTELLECTUELLE (2012). To date the general histories of 
neoliberalism are surprisingly intellectual, and nothing comparably synthetic exists on enacted policies 
of the 1970s and since. But for early pictures and building blocks, see DAVID HARVEY, THE ROAD 
FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE (Diethelm 
Plehwe & Philip Mirowski, eds., 2009); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 
(2005); see also JOHANNA BOCKMAN, MARKETS IN THE NAME OF SOCIALISM: THE LEFT-WING 
ORIGINS OF NEOLIBERALISM (2011); COLIN LEYS, MARKET-DRIVEN POLITICS: NEOLIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2003); JAMIE PECK, CONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL 
REASON (2013). For the response to recent capitalist setbacks, with heavy emphasis on the economics 
profession (rather than structural forces), see PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO 
TO WASTE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM SURVIVED THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2013). 
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The most plausible explanation for these facts is that human rights and 
neoliberalism shared both a predecessor and a target: a developmentalist 
statism that, while certainly present in the welfarist west and north, found its 
most famous expressions in Eastern Europe and the global south. Put 
differently, the paired breakthroughs of human rights and neoliberalism shared 
common institutional foes and especially negative conditions as those foes lost 
prestige. A national welfarist commitment found across the North Atlantic, 
normally defended in collectivist terms, was on the wane just as human rights 
and neoliberalism began enjoying success, and the same was even more true of 
the developmentalist vocation of the postcolonial nation-state to prioritize rapid 
growth, often by pursuing economic autarky. Without their departure, it seems 
hard to imagine that either international human rights or neoliberal frameworks 
and policies would have begun their rapid ascent in the mid-1970s, which gave 
them a kindred trajectory against a shared prior background. 
Furthermore, neoliberalism and human rights share key ideological building 
blocks. Most obviously, they share a commitment to the prime significance of 
the individual, whose freedoms matter more than collectivist endeavors, even 
when those are justified on the grounds that they will generally advance the 
well-being of individuals. More controversially, their shared antipathy towards, 
or at least suspicion of, the state, and especially the nation-state, also seems 
plain, since both reject its moral credentials (even as both rely on its agency for 
enacting policy reform). 
Though clearly neoliberalism and human rights share several negative 
conditions and ideological building blocks, the question is whether these 
common traits obscure much more than they reveal about the causal 
interdependence of the two phenomena—or, more accurately, lack thereof. 
After all, the general affinities of human rights with market fundamentalism 
only go so far. To state the obvious, for human rights’ many partisans, they are 
a discourse of hope and reform and have typically been directed at the 
totalitarian and authoritarian state. That state persists in many places today, in 
response to which human rights advocates continue to engage in their 
informational politics without any conscious commitment to a particular scheme 
of economic relations (or perhaps more accurately, with a conscious though 
frequently separate commitment to unspecified visions of social justice). The 
ongoing critique of the atrocity, despotism, and misrule of the state in which the 
human rights movement overwhelmingly engages hardly amounts to a grim 
recipe for rollback of the national welfare state and could not possibly entail 
that rollback on its own. 
And so, very quickly in the assessment of how human rights have tracked 
the emergence of a neoliberal age, one is pushed onto the ground of troubling 
chronological simultaneity, negative conditions, and vague descriptive affinity. 
All of these perhaps authorize suspicions of weak complicity, but hardly of 
more dastardly synergy, between neoliberalism and human rights. And in spite 
of these parallelisms between the two phenomena, it is an altogether different 
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matter whether the moment of success in the 1970s that each enjoyed depended 
on the success of the other. There are, in fact, many reasons to doubt that this is 
the case. 
With their scalar novelty as global principles informing a transnational 
political movement, human rights were resurrected under very specific 
circumstances from their entombment in obscure United Nations documents 
and procedures (including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 
itself and the international supervision some envisaged on its basis). There were 
three great causal factors that led to their dissemination outside the United 
Nations: (1) the loss of faith in Cold War paradigms of personal engagement 
(and notably the loss of faith in socialism) in favor of a new and putatively 
“antipolitical” sort of movement; (2) the rise of human rights as a language of 
state legitimacy in the international system, surprisingly sponsored first and 
foremost by American Presidents along with some West European leaders; and 
(3) the achievement of decolonization, which, from Western capitals, often 
seemed to cry out for a new form of rights-based international supervision that 
suddenly seemed relevant.28 
For one episode that suggests that the coincidence of the parallel 
breakthrough of neoliberalism with the emergence of international human 
rights politics may explain little, consider the example of the southern cone of 
the Americas after 1973. Notoriously, General Augusto Pinochet, after his fall 
1973 coup, adopted Milton Friedman as an adviser, and the neoliberal Mont 
Pèlerin Society held meetings in Chile. Indeed, Naomi Klein takes this example 
as the starting point in her history of neoliberal “shock.”29 In a very brief section 
of her book, the most popular history of neoliberalism ever written, Klein takes 
up how human rights imposed “blinders” on the relationship between 
capitalism and terror.30 Instead, she rightly says, Amnesty International took a 
neutral attitude toward structural matters (like the class struggle and ongoing 
counterrevolution Marxists saw) in order to focus on an informational politics 
that merely singled out incontestable state abuses.31 Marks agrees that “where 
the effects of neo-liberal reconstruction began to bite, activists confined their 
criticism to the denunciation of abuses, leaving unchallenged the conditions in 
which those abuses had become possible.”32 
But although it is true (indeed, centrally important) that the coalescence of 
a new sort of transnational-rights movement in response to Latin American 
misdeeds confined itself to state crimes, it is important to be clear about what is 
 
 28.  See Moyn, supra note 1. For even more factors, see also Jan Eckel, The Rebirth of Politics from 
the Spirit of Morality: Explaining the Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s, in THE BREAKTHROUGH: 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 1970S 226 (Jan Eckel & Samuel Moyn eds., 2013). On the American case, see 
BARBARA J. KEYS, RECLAIMING AMERICAN VIRTUE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION OF THE 
1970S 75–152 (2014). 
 29.  KLEIN, supra note 1, at 7. 
 30.  Id. at 118–21. 
 31.  Id. at 118–19. 
 32.  Marks, supra note 1, at 9. 
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and is not being said. No one asserts that this early instance of a now-familiar 
sort of informational activism was a cause of either the coups themselves or the 
disarmament of other sorts of criticism against the misdeeds of Pinochet’s 
government or other new authoritarian regimes.33 Klein, unlike Marks, registers 
clearly why, if contributory blame falls on human rights optics, it is really only 
with regard to the regime’s external critics—for, at that point in history, its 
internal opponents had no choice but to narrow their focus and ignore the 
political economy of state terror. Klein writes, “Every facet of the human rights 
movement was functioning under highly restricted circumstances . . . Inside the 
affected countries . . . they didn’t talk about the political or economic agendas 
behind the disappearances because to do so was to risk being disappeared 
themselves.”34 Klein could have added that the coalescence of a transnational 
human rights movement, for all the price that movement paid in muting 
structural critique, functioned in coalitional ways quite differently from a more 
divisive revolutionary politics. But it remains true that the international left was 
alive and well, and part of the success of human rights in the 1970s was due to 
the left’s own failure either to escape savage repression in a range of countries 
or to successfully bring together a coalition to denounce dictatorial misdeeds 
with equal success as human rights movements. It is true that Klein concludes 
that “the human rights movement also helped the Chicago School ideology to 
escape from its first bloody laboratory virtually unscathed.”35 Yet the blame it 
deserves in this regard seems rather negligible compared to a host of other 
forces—including failures and mistakes on the left at what remained a very 
open moment in history. Further, as Klein acknowledges, the human rights 
“movement unquestionably played a decisive role in forcing an end to the 
junta’s worst abuses.”36 
As for the rest of Klein’s book, which proceeds through the present, 
nowhere else does it mention human rights movements (except to rely serially 
on their information in order to frame her critique). And in any case, much 
more interesting than a debatable causal linkage between neoliberalism and 
human rights in the 1970s is the two movements’ ongoing companionship as 
they both entered adolescence in the 1980s and achieved close to full capture of 
their respective realms of governance, both on national and international 
scenes, in the 1990s. Even as the transnational left remained alive and well in 
the 1970s across the world, in the 1980s and 1990s (and indeed, through today) 
human rights frameworks came and continue to come close to occupying the 
 
 33.  One would need a much more intricate story to make the latter case, of the sort attempted (to 
my knowledge) only in the case of Uruguayan exiles after the coup in their own country in the summer 
of 1973, and the substitutional story about their peregrinations towards human rights as opposed to 
inherited leftism took long into the later decades. See VANIA MARKARIAN, LEFT IN 
TRANSFORMATION: URUGUAYAN EXILES AND THE LATIN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORKS, 
1967–1984 67–106 (2005). 
 34.  Klein, supra note 1, at 149. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 147. 
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imagination of reformist-minded individuals and groups the world over—and 
thus deserve much larger causal association with a range of phenomena. (If 
there has been “social resilience” in the face of various neoliberal successes 
worth emphasizing, the left has not fared as well, in practice and perhaps in 
theory too.37) 
And yet it remains a completely open research question how exactly to 
frame the relationship of the human rights explosion with neoliberal victory, in 
Latin America and especially beyond. Was it the same everywhere and all 
along? I do not think so, for the allegation that human rights silenced structural 
and “political” criticisms of what amounted to a neoliberal era became much 
more valid and convincing only as time went on. But there is still the work to 
accomplish to say even that much. As Mary Nolan cautiously and insightfully 
puts it, “There is no single relationship between human rights and market 
fundamentalism across countries and types of rights.”38 The same observation 
applies across time. The history of the initially distant companionship remains 
to be written. 
To me, it already seems clear that a better way to frame the relationship 
between neoliberalism and human rights, at least based on current research, is 
in terms of parallel trajectories, with the tragic consequence that (as some of 
Marks’s own brilliant work implies) structural insight into the root causes of 
social suffering went missing at the time that it was badly needed.39 Yet this 
result occurred only in small part because human rights became a more 
coalitionally successful prism for interpreting and addressing injustice than 
other imaginable frameworks. It is possible (as I have argued in The Last 
Utopia) for the prestige and prominence of international human rights to be 
symptomatic of a loss of structural accounts of social relations without their 
being causally responsible or morally culpable for it.40 If such modes of thought 
have been lacking due to the “superficiality” of the informational focus of 
human rights politics, it is not as if those politics are alone or even primarily to 
blame. The failure of a convincing structuralism and the programmatic aphasia 
that resulted is the work of many forces, and it is implausible to believe that 
either has gone missing thanks primarily to human rights hegemony. 
If all of the above holds—and one assumes that historical coincidence is not 
necessarily a causal relationship—then the analysis becomes much less one 
about blame (or excusal) and much more about the failure of structural modes 
 
 37.  See SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA (Peter A. Hall & Michèle Lamont eds., 
2013). 
 38.  Mary Nolan, Human Rights and Market Fundamentalism in the Long 1970s, in TOWARDS A 
NEW MORAL WORLD ORDER: MENSCHENRECHTSPOLITIK UND VÖLKERRECHT SEIT 1945 172, 174 
(Norbert Frei & Annette Weinke eds., 2013). The essay is a promissory note for a major research 
project that is intended to spell out the relationship in careful detail. See also Mary Nolan, Gender and 
Utopian Visions in a Post-utopian Era: Americanism, Human Rights, Market Fundamentalism, 44 CENT. 
EUR. HIST. 13 (2011). 
 39.  See Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011). 
 40.  See Moyn, supra note 1. 
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of thinking and more activist political strategies to retain widespread appeal. 
Human rights look more like a symptom of a much broader syndrome, and the 
point of criticizing them changes accordingly. It becomes about convincing their 
adherents that, although serviceable for some tasks (like singling out state 
abuses), human rights fail at others, and need to be supplemented by both new 
frameworks of analysis and new modes of intra- and transnational activism. 
IV 
THE FAILURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOCIOECONOMIC DOMAIN 
In his classic A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Marxist David Harvey is 
surprisingly generous to the birth of human rights, though he is well positioned 
to see early on that it coincided with the trajectory of his own object of study. 
He notes: 
The universalism of rights has been and can be used with progressive aims in minds. 
The tradition that is most spectacularly represented by Amnesty International, 
Médecins sans frontières, and others cannot be dismissed as a mere adjunct of 
neoliberal thinking. The whole history of humanism (both of the Western—classically 
liberal—and various non-Western versions) is too complicated for that.
41
 
And in spite of various criticisms of human rights that are easily made—
their limitation to first-generation liberties, their cooptation by imperial 
projects, their nondemocratic credentials even when intervention abroad takes 
nonmilitary form, or their elitist distance from grassroots politics—Harvey 
concludes it is a mistake to dismiss them. Instead of “eschew[ing] all appeal to 
universals as fatally flawed” and “abandon[ing] all mention of rights as an 
untenable imposition of abstract, market-based ethics as a mask for the 
restoration of class power,” in the end it would be “unfortunate to abandon the 
field of rights to neoliberal hegemony. There is a battle to be fought, not only 
over which universals and what rights should be invoked in particular situations 
but also over how universal principles and conceptions of rights should be 
constructed.”42 
However, that hypothetical apology for some version of universalism or 
even some version of human rights should not lead to complacency. It cannot 
substitute for an inquiry into how much of a difference that the actual, so-far-
enacted forms of universalistic human rights law and policy have made—
notably with respect to the economic arrangements that neoliberalism has 
transformed.43 In this regard, a harsh and unforgiving verdict on international 
human rights politics seems necessary in order to stave off sentimental hopes 
and to promote intellectual commitments and practical mobilization that will do 
better. If the human rights movement is the weak and subordinate 
doppelgänger of its neoliberal brother—with whom it is joined in a mysterious 
 
 41.  Harvey, supra note 27, at 178. 
 42.  Id. at 178–79. 
 43.  See Samuel Moyn, Do Human Rights Treaties Make Enough of a Difference?, in CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Conor Gearty & Costas Douzinas eds., 2012). 
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common destiny but merely dragged along without providing direction—then 
some other sort of opposition is necessary in both the short and long run. 
Recently, empirical political scientists have adopted the goal of verifying 
whether human rights law makes any difference—that is to say, whether it leads 
to any positive outcomes. In my view, the language of human rights has worked 
well in robbing legitimacy from certain extreme regime forms, although it is 
highly controversial whether human rights law actually played a causal role in 
the political transformation in the former Soviet bloc, Latin American 
autocracies, and elsewhere. And, in any event, any study of the uses of human 
rights law needs to incorporate attention to its misuses. Skeptical of the human 
rights mobilization across borders, leading empirical analyst Beth Simmons has 
argued plausibly that, where the political and material circumstances of modern 
citizenship already exist, human rights law allows an additional tool of domestic 
mobilization, beyond even that made available by constitutional law, at least 
when it comes to norms like freedom of speech and integrity of the human 
body.44 Harvey’s optimism about the emancipatory possibilities of rights-
claiming is most plausible in these cases. However, empirical political scientists 
so far provide no case so far for the productive uses of human rights norms 
regarding economic and social entitlements. It is indeed remarkable that 
Simmons, Kathryn Sikkink, and others who hope to redeem human rights from 
cynicism about their negligible effects have so far focused exclusively on some 
rights to the detriment of others—especially rights purporting to afford 
protections in the socioeconomic domain. 
A brief, and therefore necessarily superficial, survey of the shortcomings of 
human rights norms and movements with the structural transformations of the 
era of market fundamentalism in mind must start with a basic and rarely made 
point: In their legalized forms, human rights do not purport to provide an 
egalitarian agenda. It is perfectly possible to imagine a fully achieved local and 
global regime of human rights protection that simultaneously features the worst 
hierarchy of wealth and other primary goods known to history. Indeed, in some 
ways, grasping the paradoxical relationship of human rights and so-called 
neoliberalism amounts to seeing how thorough a disjuncture there is between 
an agenda of economic and social rights protection and a more ambitious 
egalitarian agenda.45 When it comes to the sorts of goals envisioned by the 
International Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, it is not how 
much they promise but how little that needs to receive more emphasis, since the 
covenant strives for a minimum floor of protection in domains like housing, 
 
 44.  See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 151–71 (2011). 
 45.  For a less oppositional view that nonetheless recognizes the different vocations of (canonically 
established) economic rights and theories of overall social justice, see Jeremy Waldron, Socioeconomic 
Rights and Theories of Justice (New York University School of Law Public Law and Research Paper 
Series Working Paper No. 10-79, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1699898. 
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health, and food, rather than a fuller bodied egalitarianism. 
It is popular, and understandable, to focus on those episodes (Pinochet’s 
Chile, for example) where neoliberal policies have gone along with state 
repression—which Klein’s indictment of the shock doctrine dramatizes (or 
sensationalizes). But, in certain ways, it seems much more disturbing to observe 
that neoliberal victories are perfectly compatible with full respect for not just 
civil and political liberties, but also for economic and social rights. If one 
extrapolates the most extreme possible illustration of this point, it is perfectly 
possible to imagine an alternate reality in which one man personally owns 
everything, but with all the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights nonetheless honored (through his subsistence spending). Even the 
much-ridiculed promise in the Universal Declaration’s Article 27 of paid 
vacations is completely harmonious with a world controlled by a galloping 
hierarchy of means.46 Society has indeed headed towards a scenario in the last 
thirty years where a formerly egalitarian impulse has sometimes successfully 
been displaced, as inequality has spiked, by an agenda in which a set of 
protections alleviates the most abject destitution. Generalizing drastically, it is 
fair to say that the present era of world history is one in which a floor has been 
partially built to save the wretched of the earth from the worst suffering, even 
as the ceiling for hierarchical wealth concentration has been obliterated.47 
The conceptual point, in other words, is that an economic and social rights 
agenda is different—and much more minimalist—than an egalitarian agenda. It 
is perfectly possible for one to succeed as the other fails. The historical point is 
that the ends of the first agenda have often been prioritized—and sometimes 
achieved—across an era during which the ends of the second agenda have been 
forsaken. But two crucial qualifications are necessary to understand the 
historically juxtaposed trajectories of the two agendas. For one thing, for all the 
progress made in saving humanity from the most extreme sorts of immiseration, 
much remains to be done even to provide a floor of basic protection. No one 
wants to trivialize social and economic rights protection, even in the name of a 
plausible indictment of aphasia concerning broader patterns of wealth and 
income distribution and rising inequality. Second, even successes in the 
socioeconomic domain have hardly been due to the application of a normative 
framework of human rights, the birth of a formal regime of human rights law, or 
the mobilizational activism of any human rights movement. In fact, the lion’s 
share of poverty reduction in the last few decades (indeed, given the population 
numbers involved, in world history by far) is due to a single factor: the policies 
of the Chinese state.48 And although a wide range of factors account for the 
 
 46.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10. 
 47.  See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 
 48.  According to one source, China brought more than 600 million people out of poverty across 
the era of neoliberalism (1980–2010), accounting for three-quarters of all poverty reduction worldwide. 
See Towards the End of Poverty, THE ECONOMIST, June 1, 2013, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21578665-nearly-1-billion-people-have-been-taken-out-
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remainder of poverty reduction—food and water access, health improvement, 
and so on—it does not seem as if human rights protection or promotion as 
frameworks or projects rank high among them, if they figure on the list at all. 
Now consider this deflationary perspective about the value of economic and 
social rights agendas (set off from the protection of those rights achieved 
through other frameworks or thanks to other means) by starting with domestic 
or national protection and then turning to more transnational and global 
protection. There is no doubt that, after the first phase of human rights history 
in the 1970s and 1980s, during which a global dialogue concerning economic and 
social rights was largely absent, such discourse has surged. But, sadly, this 
rhetorical and framing (or, more generously, standard-setting) work has caused 
no shifts in real-world outcomes independently. This is most graphically clear 
when it comes to the highly prestigious model of judicial enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights, especially when national judiciaries interpret 
constitutional norms in the spirit of international human rights law (including 
by relying on its notion of a minimum core of protection). 
For many years, South Africa was credited as the laboratory where these 
developments were pioneered, especially after the landmark Grootboom case.49 
In particular, for several years, some leading American academics praised the 
“democracy-forcing” manner in which South African courts both advanced 
socioeconomic rights and respected democratic legitimacy when it came to 
policy choices.50 On this interpretation, courts could invalidate policies that 
failed to respect a designated minimum core of socioeconomic rights protection 
while refusing to craft enforcement remedies of their own, thereby prompting 
democratic branches of government to do so.51 But, especially on this minimalist 
and noninterventionist model, the final results have been disappointing: it turns 
out that the South African judiciary, instead of encouraging legislative or 
political action, forced the democratic branches into a nonresponse. 
Unfortunately, it is plausible to conclude that judicial enforcement has failed to 
make a great deal of difference, both in South Africa and beyond.52 In 
particular, as David Landau has shown, enforcement of economic rights by 
courts tend to favor the well-off (such as pensioners defending entitlements 
against state rollback under budgetary pressure) rather than the weakest and 
 
extreme-poverty-20-years-world-should-aim. 
 49.  See Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others 2001 
(1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Af.) (vindicating social and economic rights of applicants and encouraging 
government policy to implement them). 
 50.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 221–38 (2001); 
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW chs. 6–8 (2009). 
 51.  See Sunstein, supra note 50. It is a story that likely seemed especially appealing to Americans 
because of their own country’s failure to constitutionalize social rights at the zenith of liberal judicial 
power and persistent worries since of the political power of the charge that judges might “legislate from 
the bench.” 
 52.  See Paul O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic Rights, 74 MOD. L. REV. 532 (2011). 
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most vulnerable.53 Of course, the failure of judicial enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights does not mean that other attempts to protect 
socioeconomic rights have necessarily failed. But, so far, there is no powerful 
evidence confirming the value that a human rights framework brings to the 
reformulation of citizenship in a welfarist direction thanks to other forces (for 
example, partisan mobilization, which Simmons has credited for improvement 
when it comes to political and civil rights).54 
Meanwhile, in international law, there is currently a burgeoning debate 
about how international human rights norms do or might tame or counteract 
globalization, especially in its recent neoliberal mode. This debate has exploded 
in two concurrent arenas: international trade law and policy on the one hand 
and corporate social responsibility on the other. But the most generous thing to 
say is that it is too early for much more than the declaration of normative 
applicability of human rights principles in either domain. 
Petersmann and many others have argued that, by and large, the 
relationship between globalization and human rights is essentially one of 
mutual reinforcement or even common identity, especially when rights of 
property and free enterprise are made the key to the enjoyment of other human 
goods since property rights and free enterprise allow the funding for these other 
goods to materialize.55 The more that free trade is allowed to maximize wealth 
for all, the better the outcomes will be across all dimensions of concern that 
human rights aim to cover. The response of mainstream human rights scholars 
to this claim is to insist on the separability and priority of the norms of which 
they are the stewards, guarding them against being falsely represented as simple 
side effects or fringe benefits of some other project, like economic growth.56 
Although optimists in the mainstream continue to hold out hope for “linkage” 
in the trade arena and the rise of rights principles within corporate social 
responsibility, it is hard to conclude that the grounds for hope are justified on 
the basis of the record so far.57 
In perhaps the most developed version of this mainstream account, David 
Kinley has argued that if globalization is tweaked in the name of external 
international human rights standards that it sometimes regrettably fails to 
respect, it can indeed provide the benefits that its more naïve enthusiasts 
 
 53.  See David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 401 (2011). 
 54.  See Simmons, supra note 44. 
 55.  See Petersmann, supra note 6. 
 56.  See Alston, supra note 8. 
 57.  Petersmann has made much clearer in response to the polemics of a decade ago that he does 
not regard “linkage” of human rights and trade liberalization to be solely on the latter’s terms, thus 
making his proximity to mainstream optimists about the possibility of finding a zone of overlap 
between capitalism and human rights (and vice versa) clearer than before. See Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, The Promise of Linking Human Rights and Trade, in LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS:NEW POLICY SPACE IN HARD ECONOMIC TIMES (Daniel Drache & Lesley A. Jacobs 
eds., 2014). 
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celebrate as automatic.58 His position is that, if the equally regrettable extremes 
of uncritical partisanship and skeptical demonization of globalizing markets are 
avoided, the large amount of overlap between market forces and human rights 
can be discovered and “crossovers and complementarities” between the two 
maximized.59 For Kinley and others writing in this vein, neoliberal market 
fundamentalists are bad apples who inappropriately extend their otherwise 
healthy respect for the ability of free trade and multinational corporations to 
raise humanity out of indigence, and transform this respect into the mistaken 
beliefs that there are no defects to globalizing capital and that all human goods 
are advanced by it. Conversely, critics of “neoliberalism” refuse to see that 
globalization has progressive features and believe that it is purely evil.60 With a 
prophylaxis against the extremes, the task of ethical globalization is where hope 
for the future lies. 
Yet just as in the case of social rights prospectively enforced by judicial 
authority, it is unsurprising that in both international trade law and corporate 
social responsibility, human rights have proved distressingly ineffective, and this 
seems unlikely to change.61 To be sure, human rights have made discursive 
inroads, albeit surprisingly recently, in the trade debate. As late as 2006, when 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General Pascal Lamy offered a call 
in Santiago to move beyond the Washington Consensus, human rights did not 
figure into the discussion.62 But, then again, the raft of criticism of the 
Washington Consensus before that date rarely appealed to human rights.63 (It 
more frequently insisted that trade arrangements pay developmental benefits 
for the worst off rather than that they respect human rights.) With surprising 
speed, however, the intersection of international trade and human rights has 
taken on something of the character of an obligatory topic in WTO circles, and 
it seems plausible (though, as noted above, no one has undertaken to prove it 
empirically) that, in the areas of labor regulation and pharmaceutical patents, 
human rights have had some salutary effects in framing claims and even in 
promoting better outcomes. 
But it is another matter to hypothesize much of a general reorientation of 
trade law by international human rights norms, law, or politics. Even 
mainstream analysts acknowledge that human rights norms have made little 
rhetorical headway in trade debates, and although the WTO’s dispute 
resolution mechanism has teeth, it is not a plausible agent for the general 
advancement of human rights outcomes.64 Andrew Lang’s brilliant essay on 
 
 58.  See Kinley, supra note 9. 
 59.  Id. at 32. 
 60.  See Howard-Hassman, supra note 9. 
 61.  See ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wolfgang Benedek et al. eds., 2011) 
(providing survey of the human rights prospects in diverse areas of economic law). 
 62.  See Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Organization, Humanising Globalisation 
(Santiago, Chile, Jan. 30, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl16_e.htm. 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  According to Kinley, “I have lost count of the number of trade specialists (lawyers, 
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neoliberal trade law sympathetically considers what would work, compared to 
recent history, in which human rights have provided little beyond discursive 
sensitization.65 Lang convincingly worries that it is only a reform of the 
collective purposes of the trade regime itself that would provide better 
normative guidance (and, one might add, more robust politicization both in 
theory and practice).66 A focus on the effect of trade on human rights law from 
the outside, as it were, has the function 
of occluding the question of collective purpose in the conduct of international 
economic governance. Where critical voices should be generating a debate about the 
fundamental purposes of global trade governance, instead they have given rise to a 
discussion of the relative priority to be accorded to the trade project vis-à-vis other 
projects of international order. What should be a debate about re-opening space for 
discussing the collective purposes of global trade governance, instead has to a large 
extent become a debate about the appropriate allocation of authority between the 
global trade regime and other centres of regulatory and political authority [like human 
rights law]. . . . [A]ttempts to integrate consideration of ‘social’ values and objectives 
into the trade regime are unlikely to bear much fruit unless they are accompanied by a 
much more fundamental challenge to prevailing understandings of the nature and 
purpose of the trade regime.
67
 
Lang himself casts this possible move as a return to the “embedded” 
liberalism of the immediate post–World War II years, and he thinks human 
rights are potentially part of the normative vocabulary that would provide this 
return or renewal.68 Whether or not he is persuasive on either count, it seems 
hard to doubt his conclusion that the superficiality of the effects of human rights 
politics on trade outcomes so far demands some other approach. 
Similar observations apply to corporate social responsibility, which has a 
history that is even shorter with regard to the incorporation of human rights 
norms, but which is subject to a parallel analysis as that of international trade 
law. Indeed, the rise of human rights in the governance of corporations 
(especially among multinational corporations) is not only more recent but has 
come about in explicitly nonlegal, “moral” form. Famously, after the death of 
the U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, John Ruggie 
stepped in as special representative to offer “pragmatic” and nonlegal Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, approved by the Human Rights 
Council in 2011.69 Charitably, it is far too early for optimism about the 
 
economists, national and international bureaucrats, and academics) who roll their eyes whenever 
mention is made of human rights and trade.” KINLEY, supra note 9, at 91. On dispute resolution, see 
JAMES HARRISON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (2006). 
 65.  See ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011). 
 66.  Id. at 190–220. 
 67.  Id. at 10–11. However, Lang, I believe, goes too far in saying that a human rights strategy is 
“inadvertently complicit in the basic neoliberal move of occluding” collective purpose—unless it could 
be shown that human rights seriously obstruct it, as opposed to distract from or simply fail to reach it. 
 68.  Id. at 313–54. 
 69.  John Gerard Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. 
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meaningful chastening of corporations simply because of the existence of these 
principles, especially given the step away from legality (and sometimes rights 
themselves) that Ruggie controversially took in order make consent toward 
them possible. 
As a general matter, mainstream proponents of human rights mechanisms in 
the socioeconomic domain place faith in what one might call an “infiltrative” 
model of politics, in which what is introduced as apparently harmless subterfuge 
will end up creating conditions for a powerful threat. But Ruggie’s principles 
seem even less likely to change behavior than other generally empty Trojan 
horses that the human rights movement has built across its short history. Of 
course, this hardly implies that the new principles are worthless—let alone so 
accommodating as to provide collusive shelter to global corporate power. Time 
alone will tell if they transcend their current uselessness, but it is not a good bet. 
In an era when human rights chiefly have a rhetorical value in international 
trade and corporate responsibility alike, the main effect they do risk is a 
compensatory one, even as the chief practical challengers of neoliberalism, from 
the Seattle protests against the WTO of 1999 to Occupy Wall Street fifteen 
years later, generally skirt the normative claims, legal regimes, and 
mobilizational strategies of human rights in favor of other rubrics and styles. As 
Lang puts it, 
it is important not to overstate the extent to which human rights have been adopted 
more broadly as the language of the global justice movement. For every NGO that 
adopts a rights perspective or uses rights language, there are many more which do not, 
and still more who do so only partially or tangentially.
70
 
Alas, this does not mean that anyone is, as of yet, in possession of a 
plausible framework of opposition to market fundamentalism, either 
intellectually or practically. But this hardly makes human rights necessary or 
inevitable as a means of reorienting economic affairs, especially given their 
failures to change the world so far. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: FORMS OF CRITICISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Whatever the obscure prehistories of international human rights and global 
neoliberalism were up until the 1970s, when both began to ascend in 
prominence, each of these phenomena enjoyed only minor successes until the 
era surrounding the end of the Cold War, which provided each an extraordinary 
space of opportunity. The World Conference on Human Rights, which took 
place in Vienna in 1993, provided a moment of imaginative relaunching of 
 
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). See also John Gerard Ruggie, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013). 
 70.  Lang, supra note 65, at 100 (rigorously cataloguing the rise of human rights in trade debates 
after the catalytic period of 1997–2000, particularly around the TRIPS agreement). Cf. Tomer Broude, 
From Seattle to Occupy: The Shifting Focus of Global Protest, in LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (2014). 
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human rights corresponding to the founding of the WTO in 1995. The trouble is 
that so far—and in contrast to their signal role in targeting and stigmatizing 
totalitarian and authoritarian states—human rights have remained chiefly 
rhetorical in their inroads into the socioeconomic domain, whereas 
neoliberalism has transformed the globe profoundly. More challengingly, even 
when it comes to the ends of human rights protection, neoliberalism has 
sometimes done a better job than actual human rights movements: even as 
neoliberalism has had disastrous effects on wealth distribution both within 
states and across the globe, it has provided more poverty reduction, especially 
in its Chinese form, than any other agent. (This is not to say that neoliberalism 
unerringly works for the benefit of all humanity, as some of its proponents 
claim). 
In part for this reason, marginal skeptics about the role of human rights in 
the global economy reply to mainstream optimists that the tweaks they 
entertain to the international economic order are not enough. According to 
skeptics, the mainstream is too uncritical of globalization itself to be trusted 
with the task of separating the wheat from the chaff. The mainstream puts a 
high premium on successfully avoiding naïve celebration of market 
fundamentalism, but puts an only slightly modified version of that same set of 
commitments in its place. For Paul O’Connell, there is no way to save 
globalization from neoliberalism without the drastic transformation of politics 
and economics that he calls “subaltern globalization.”71 Susan Marks, for her 
part, focuses on the way in which human rights law, even when it purports to 
seek root causes of human rights violations, is not currently organized to permit 
the sort of structural critique eventually needed to target neoliberalism—or 
perhaps capitalism in any of its possible variants.72 A new approach to politics 
and law would require a systemic evaluation of the causes of and alternatives to 
“planned misery.”73 In their current forms at least, international human rights 
generally provide a distraction from both the necessary diagnosis and the 
necessary remedy.74 
Although it is hard to gainsay the sobering conclusions of such critics, I have 
been concerned in this article with a cautionary point. For it is equally hard to 
conclude that blaming human rights regimes and movements of “complicity” 
with neoliberalism is itself productive. As I have indicated, I do not think 
human rights do or should provide the final normative standards against which 
economic arrangements should be judged wanting: they are too minimalistic to 
do so, especially in the socioeconomic domain, where an egalitarian theory of 
 
 71.  Paul O’Connell, On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human Rights, 
7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 493–95 (2007). See also Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Reply, 9 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 127 (2009); Paul O’Connell, Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 135 (2009). 
 72.  See Marks, supra note 39. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Marks, supra note 1. 
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social justice provides a more defensible (and much higher) bar to meet.75 But 
the minimalist standards of judgment for gross failure that human rights norms 
offer hardly themselves pose an obstruction (let alone the main one) to 
maximalist alternatives. The ethical standards of human rights are not 
necessarily “part of the problem” in the quest to develop either a higher 
standard for judgment or the political basis for a movement to meet it. The 
same, mutatis mutandis, is true of human rights regimes and movements. But 
this defense of human rights in an age of galloping inequality is obviously faint 
praise.76 
It also follows that criticizing either the norms or the movements for 
distraction and insufficiency is important but minimal in itself. In an era in 
which human rights norms and movements are frequently overloaded with 
expectation, the best conclusion is that a Band-Aid is not an adequate response 
to a charnelhouse (even if Band-Aids have their uses). Analytically and 
politically, the mere act of criticizing human rights does little to provide useful 
alternatives to human rights frameworks, regimes, and movements that might 
succeed in areas where human rights have failed—in part because human rights 
are (so far) not designed to succeed in those areas. To bring the limited aims 
and often glancing successes of human rights movements into focus is simply to 
demand another politics to supplement goals that are inadequate in the first 
place and strategies that rarely work, especially in the socioeconomic domain. A 
threatening enemy, rather than a powerless companion, is what market 
fundamentalism demands. 
 
 
 75.  For this reason, it seems mistaken to me for O’Connell to treat human rights norms as the 
main normative standards against which to judge neoliberal globalization wanting, and to motivate the 
call for a subaltern globalization. After all, there is a wide range of ends international human rights are 
simply not trying to achieve, equality perhaps first among them. 
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